Weapons of Terror vs. Weapons of War

"This is a weapon of terror. It's made to intimidate the enemy. This is a weapon of war. It's made to kill your enemy." Anyone who's seen Stargate SG-1 (and many who haven't) will know the scene I'm quoting. In it, Col. Jack O'Neill, of the US Air Force, compares an FN P90 against a Ma'Tok staff weapon. O'Neill is pointing out that, while the staff weapon is certainly much larger, more intimidating, and fires a more damaging projectile than the relatively compact P90, in practice, the P90's superior accuracy and higher rate of fire makes it far more effective in combat than the slow-firing, inaccurate Ma'Tok.

A similar comparison could be made between the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the US Navy. Much ink has been spilled over the rapidly increasing size of the PLAN, with some commentators even suggesting that larger fleets automatically win wars. However, missing from that analysis is any mention of fleet composition. The Chinese Navy, consisting of 427 oceangoing ships, consists largely of offshore patrol vessels (127), corvettes (71), frigates (45), and destroyers (49). China does have 72 submarines, but the majority are diesel-electric boats, with only a handful being nuclear powered. Furthermore, there remain serious questions about the capability of Chinese nuclear submarines. China has three aircraft carriers, only two of which are meant to be operational in war, and only one of which possesses a catapult launching system that allows it to sortie aircraft without significantly limiting their range and payload.

In short, the PLAN is a weapon of terror. The large number of destroyers, frigates and corvettes mean that the Chinese navy can be widely deployed during peacetime, contesting Vietnam's claims to the Paracel Islands, backing up the Chinese Coast Guard and Chinese maritime militia's efforts to contest Filipino sovereignty over the Scarborough and Second Thomas Shoals, carrying out exercises meant to simulate a blockade of Taiwan, and numerous other missions aimed at convincing China's maritime neighbors that the PLAN is strong, omnipresent and any resistance would be swiftly replied to by one or more ships that are larger and pack more firepower than anything fielded by Vietnam, Taiwan or the Philippines. However, in any larger confrontation, China's cruisers and destroyers are vulnerable. They lack long range sensors, and would be tied to aircraft operating from fixed island bases that can be targeted or blockaded. The PLAN's diesel-electric submarines have neither the speed nor endurance to fight at any significant distance from Chinese shores, and China's one modern supercarrier would face numerous competing priorities in any confrontation with a near-peer adversary.

The US Navy, by contrast, is a weapon of war. Unlike the PLAN, whose ships appear to operate largely independently, the US Navy's surface fleet is organized into battle groups, each centered on one of eleven modern aircraft carriers. Each of these battle groups is capable of operating without land-based support, and has enough firepower that the only reasonable counter would be another carrier battle group. The US Navy's 50 submarines are all nuclear powered, and are far more stealthy than their Chinese counterparts. Unlike their Chinese counterparts, many US Navy submarines possess vertical launch system (VLS) tubes, enabling them to efficiently attack surface and ground targets at long ranges with cruise missiles. In any actual conflict scenario against the United States, PLAN vessels operating piecemeal would find themselves isolated and vulnerable, while US ships would be operating in mutually reinforcing teams, with cruisers, destroyers and carriers reinforcing each others' strengths and covering each others' weaknesses.

While the sheer size of a country's navy is certainly an indication of its maritime power, fleet composition, training, and tactics matters just as much as how many ships one can put into the water. In those areas it's far less clear that the PLAN possesses a decisive edge over the US Navy. And without those, a navy that looks intimidating during peacetime is merely a collection of targets during war.